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Abstract
In this paper convex fuzzy games are defined, and their proper-
ties as well as properties of some solution concepts are presented.
1Preliminaries
Let $N=\{1,2, \ldots, n\}$ be anonempty set of players considering possibi-
lities of fuzzy cooperation, i.e. the players may be involved in coopera-
tion with participation levels varying between 0(non-cooperation) and 1
(full cooperation). Formally, afuzzy coalition of players in $N$ is avector
$s\in[0,1]^{N}$ , whose the $i$ -th coordinate $s_{i}$ is called the participation level
of player $i$ . Instead of $[0, 1]^{N}$ we will also write $\mathcal{F}^{N}$ for the set of fuzzy
coalitions. Special cases of fuzzy coalitions are those corresponding to crisp
coalitions $S\in 2^{N}$ , which are denoted by $e^{S}$ , where $e_{i}^{S}=1$ if $i\in S$ and
$e_{i}^{S}=0$ if $i\in N\backslash S$ . Then $e^{\emptyset}=(0, \ldots, 0)$ stands for the empty coalition
in afuzzy setting, $e^{N}=(1, \ldots, 1)$ denotes the grand coalition, whereas $e^{i}$ is
the fuzzy coalition corresponding to the crisp coalition $S=\{i\}$ (and also the
$i$ -th standard basis vector in $\Re^{N}$ ). One can identify afuzzy coalition with
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apoint in the hypercube $[0, 1]^{N}$ ;the fuzzy coalitions $e^{S}$ , $S\in 2^{N}$ , are the $2^{|N|}$
extreme points (vertices) of this hypercube. Acooperative fuzzy game with
player set $N$ is afunction $v$ : $F^{N}arrow\Re$ with the property $v(e^{\emptyset})=0$ , assigning
to each fuzzy coalition the value achieved as the result of cooperation with
participation levels $s_{i}$ , $i\in N$ . We denote the set of fuzzy games with player
set $N$ by $FG^{N}$ . The set of non-empty fuzzy coalitions will be denoted by
$F_{0}^{N}$ .
Many solution concepts for games with fuzzy coalitions have been developed:
cores (Aubin (1974); Branzei et al. (2002c); Tijs et al. (2002b); Ishihara et
al. (2003) $)$ ; Shapley values (Aubin (1974), (1981); Butnariu (1978); Branzei
et al. (2002a) $)$ and Shapley functions (Tsurumi et al. (2001)); path solu-
tions, path solution cover, hypercubes and compromise values (Branzei et
al. (2002b) $)$ ; monotonic allocation schemes such as FPMAS (Tsurumi et al.
(2001) $)$ , pamas (Branzei et al. (2002a)), and $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}$-pamas(Tijs et al. (2002a));
the egalitarian solution (Branzei et al. (2002c)).
We briefly recall the definitions of those solution concepts that are of special
interest for this paper.
Let $s\in F^{N}$ and denote car(s) $=\{i\in N|s_{i}>0\}$ . Let $v\in FG^{N}$ . The
imputation set $I(v)$ of $v$ is
$I(v)=\{x$
$\in\Re^{N}|\sum_{i\in N}x_{i}=v(e^{N})$
, $x_{i}\geq v(e^{i})$ for each $i\in N\}$ ;
the Aubin core $C(v)$ of $v$ (Aubin (1974)) is
$C(v)= \{x\in\Re^{N}|\sum_{i\in N}x_{i}=v(e^{N})$ ,
$\sum_{i\in N}s_{i}x_{i}\geq v(s)$ for each $s\in F^{N}\}$ ;
the proper core $C^{P}(v)\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\cdot v$ (Tijs et al. (2002b)) is
$C^{P}(v)= \{x\in\Re^{N}|\sum_{i\in N}x_{i}=v(e^{N})$ ,
$\sum_{i\in N}s_{i}x_{i}\geq v(s)$ , $s\in F^{N}$ , car(s) $\neq N\}$ ;
the crisp core $C^{cr}(v)$ of $v$ (Tijs et.al. (2002b)) is
$C^{cr}(v)= \{x\in\Re^{N}|\sum_{i\in N}x_{i}=v(e^{N}),\sum_{i\in car(e^{S})}x_{i}\geq v(S)$ for each $S\in 2^{N}\}$ .
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The dominance core (D core $DC(v)$ oiv and stable sets K are based on $dom_{s}$
and dom relations on $I(v)$ . Let x, y $\in I(v)$ and s $\in F^{N}$ . Then x $dom_{s}y$ if
$x_{i}>y_{i}$ for all i $\in car(s)$ and $\sum_{i\in N}s_{i}x_{i}\leq v(s);xdomy$ if there is s $\in \mathcal{F}^{N}$
such that x $dom_{s}y$ . The negation of xdomy is denoted here by $\neg x$ dom y.
$DC(v)=$ {$x\in I(v)|\neg xdomy$ for all $y\in I(v)$ }
is the subset of $I(v)$ of undominated elements.
Astable set of $v$ is anonempty set $K$ of imputations such that: for all
$x$ , $y\in K$ , $\neg xdomy$ , and for all $z\in I(v)\backslash K$ , there is $x\in K$ with $xdomz$ .
The fuzzy Shapley value $\phi(v)$ and the fuzzy Weber set $W(v)$ (Branzei et
al. (2002a) $)$ are given by:
$\phi(v)=\frac{1}{|N|!}\sum_{\sigma\in\Pi(N)}m^{\sigma}(v);W(v)=conv\{m^{\sigma}(v)|\sigma\in\square (N)\}$ ,
where $\Pi(N)$ stands for the set of linear orderings of $N$ , and $m^{\sigma}(v)$ for each
$\sigma\in\Pi(N)$ is the marginal vector with for $i–\sigma(k)$ , the $i$ -th coordinate
$m_{i}^{\sigma}(v)$ given by
$m_{i}^{\sigma}(v)=v( \sum_{r=1}^{k}e^{\sigma(r)})-v(\sum_{r=1}^{k-1}e^{\sigma(r)})$
One can identify a $\sigma\in\Pi(N)$ with an $n$ -step walk along the edges of the
hypercube of fuzzy coalitions starting in $e^{\emptyset}$ and ending in $e^{N}$ by passing
the vertices $e^{\sigma(1)}$ , $e^{\sigma(1)}+e^{\sigma(2)}$ , $\ldots$ , $\sum_{r=1}^{n-1}e^{\sigma(r)}$ . The vector $m^{\sigma}(v)$ records the
changes in value from vertex to vertex.
Aspecial class of fuzzy games with anon-empty Aubin core is the class
of convex fuzzy games introduced in Branzei et al. (2002a). The purpose
of this paper is on one hand to present the definition and (characterizing)
properties for convex fuzzy games (Section 2), and on the other hand to offer
an overview on special properties of solution concepts on the cone of convex
fuzzy games, stressing on the solution concepts of participation monotonic al-
location scheme, the egalitarian solution and the equal division core (Section
3). Section 4concludes with some final remarks
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2 Definition and properties of convex fuzzy
games.
Let $N$ be afinite set and let $v$ : $[0, 1]^{N}arrow\Re$ be areal-valued function on
$[0, 1]^{N}$ Then
(i) $v$ is called asupermodular function on $[0, 1]^{N}$ if
$v(s\vee t)+v(s\Lambda t)\geq v(s)+v(t)$ for all $s$ , $t\in[0,1]^{N}$ ,
where $s\vee t$ and $s\Lambda t$ are those elements of $[0, 1]^{N}$ with the $i$ -th coordinate
equal to $\max\{s_{i}, t_{i}\}$ and $\min\{s_{i}, t_{i}\}$ , respectively;
(ii) $v$ is called acoordinate-wise convex function if for each $i\in N$ and
each $s^{-i}\in[0,1]^{N\backslash \{i\}}$ the function gs-i : $[0, 1]arrow\Re$ with $g_{s}-\dot{.}(t)=v(s^{-i}||t)$
for each $t\in[0,1]$ is aconvex function. Here $(s^{-i}||t)$ is the element in $[0, 1]^{N}$
with $(s^{-i}||t)_{j}=s_{j}$ for each $j\in N\backslash \{i\}$ and $(s^{-i}||t)_{i}=t$ .
(ii) $v$ is said to satisfy the increasing average marginal return property
(IAMR-property) if for each $i\in N$ , $s^{1}$ , $s^{2}\in F^{N}$ with $s^{1}\leq s^{2}$ and each
$\epsilon_{1}$ , $\epsilon_{2}>0$ with $s_{i}^{1}+\epsilon_{1}\leq s_{i}^{2}+\epsilon_{2}\leq 1$
$\epsilon_{1}^{-1}(v(s^{1}+\epsilon_{1}e^{i})-v(s^{1}))\leq\epsilon_{2}^{-1}(v(s^{2}+\epsilon_{2}e^{i})-v(s^{2}))$ .
The IAMR-property expresses the fact that an increase in participation level
of any player in asmaller coalition yields per unit of participation level less
than an increase in participation level in abigger coalition under the condi-
tion that the reached level of participation in the first case is still not bigger
than the reached participation level in the second case. The IAMR-property
turns out to be crucial for convex fuzzy games as we see in Theorem 4.
Definition 1Let $v\in FG^{N}$ . The fuzzy game $v$ is called a convex fuzzy game
if the function $v:\mathrm{J}^{0,1]^{N}}arrow\Re$ is a supermodular and a coordinate-wise convex
function on $[0, 1]$
Remark 2A weaker definition of convexity, where only the supermodularity
property is used, is given in Tsurumi et al (2001).
We denote the set of fuzzy games with player set $N$ by CFGN. Some
properties of convex fuzzy games are given in the next proposition
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Proposition 3Let v $\in CFG^{N}$ . Then the following properties hold:
(i) (Increasing fuzzy marginal contribution for players). Let i $\in N$ , $s^{1}$ , $s^{2}\in$
$\mathcal{F}^{N}$ with $s^{1}\leq s^{2}$ and let $\epsilon$ $\in\Re_{+}$ with $0\leq\epsilon$ $\leq 1-s_{i}^{2}$ . Then
$v(s^{1}+\epsilon e^{i})-v(s^{1})\leq v(s^{2}+\epsilon e^{i})-v(s^{2})$ .
(ii)(Increasing fuzzy marginal contribution for coalitions). Let $s$ , $t\in F^{N}$ and
$z\in\Re_{+}^{N}$ such that $s\leq t\leq t+z\leq e^{N}$ . Then
$v(s+z)-v(s)\leq v(t+z)-v(t)$ .
(iii) (Stable marginal contribution property). For each $\sigma\in\square (N)$ the fuzzy
marginal vector $m^{\sigma}(v)$ is a core element.
Proof. See Proposition 3and 4, and Theorem 7in Branzei et al. (2002a).
$\blacksquare$
Theorem 4Let v $\in FG^{N}$ . Then v $\in CFG^{N}$ iff the increasing average
marginal return property (IAMR-property) holds.
Proof. See Theorem 6in Branzei et al. (2002a). wt
Remark 5Convex fuzzy games form a convex cone, that is for all v, w $\in$
$CFG^{N}$ and all a, b $\geq 0$ , $av+bw\in CFG^{N}$ .
For examples of convex fuzzy games the reader is referred to Branzei et
al. $(2002 \mathrm{a},\mathrm{b},\mathrm{c})$ and Tijs et al. (2002b).
3Solution concepts for convex fuzzy games
First, we pay attention to the solution concepts for fuzzy games whose def-
initions are provided in Section 1of this paper. As in the case of con-
vex crisp games these solutions behave nicely on the class of convex fuzzy
games. Let $v\in FG^{N}$ ;then the cooperative $\mathrm{n}$-person game $cr(v)$ defined by
$cr(v)(S)=v(e^{S})$ for each $S\in 2^{N}$ is called the crisp game corresponding to
$v$ . For $v\in CFG^{N}$ the corresponding crisp game $cr(v)$ is also convex (see
Proposition 2in Branzei et al. (2002a) $)$ .
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Theorem 6Let $v$ , $w\in CFG^{N}$ . Then
(i) $C(v)=C(cr(v))_{f}C(v)=W(v)$ , and $C(v+w)=C(v)+C(w),$ $W(v)=$
$W(cr(v)),\cdot$
(ii) $\phi(v)\in C(v)$ ($\phi(v)$ is the barycenter of the core), $\phi(v)=\phi(cr(v))$ , and
$\phi(v+w)=\phi(v)+\phi(w)$ .
Proof. See Theorem 7and Proposition 8in Branzei et al. (2002a). $\blacksquare$
Remark 7The fact that $C(v)=W(v)$ does not necessarily imply that the
fuzzy game v is convex (see Example 5in Branzei et al. (2002a)).




(iv) $DC(v)$ is the unique stable set.
Proof. See Tijs et al. (2002b). $\blacksquare$
Interesting solution concepts for convex fuzzy games as those of partici-
pation monotonic allocation schemes (pamas) and the egalitarian solution
introduced in Branzei et al. (2002a) and (2002c), respectively. We define
these solutions and present briefly their properties in the rest of this section.
In the definition of pamas the notion of $\mathrm{t}$-restricted game plays arole.
Definition 9Let $v\in FG^{N}$ and $t\in F^{N}$ . The $t$ restricted game of $v$ is the
game $v_{t}$ : $F^{N}arrow\Re$ given by $v_{t}(s)=v(t*s)$ for all $s\in \mathcal{F}^{N}$ . Here $t*s$ is the
coordinate-wise product of $t$ and $s$ , that is $(t*s)_{i}=t_{i}s_{i}$ for all $i\in N$ .
Remark 10 If v $\in CFG^{N}$ , then also $v_{t}\in CFG^{N}$ for each t $\in \mathcal{F}^{N}$ . This
is the fuzzy analogue of the fact that subgames of crisp convex games are
convex.
Definition 11 A game $v\in FG^{N}$ is called totally balanced if $C(v)\neq\emptyset$ and
$C(v_{t})\neq\emptyset$ for all $t\in F^{N}$ .
Definition 12 Let $v\in FG^{N}$ be a totally balanced game. A scheme $[a_{t,i}]_{t\in \mathcal{F}^{N},i\in N}$
is called a participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas) if
(i) $(a_{t,i})_{i\in N}\in C(v_{t})$ for each $t\in \mathcal{F}^{N}$ (stability condition);
(ii) $t_{i}^{-1}a_{t,i}\geq s_{i}^{-1}a_{s,i}$ for each $s$ , $t\in \mathcal{F}^{N}$ with $s\leq t$ and each $i\in car(s)$
(participation monotonicity condition)
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Definition 13 Let v $\in FG^{N}$ and x $\in C(v)$ . Then we call x pamas-
extendable if there exists a pamas $[a_{t,i}]_{t\in \mathcal{F}^{N},i\in N}$ such that $a_{e^{N},i}=x_{i}$ for each
i $\in N$ .
Theorem 14 Let v $\in CFG^{N}$ . Then each x $\in C(v)$ is pamas-extendable.
Proof, See Theorem 10 in Branzei et al. (2002a). $\blacksquare$
For each $v\in CFG^{N}$ the total fuzzy Shapley value, which is the scheme
$[\phi_{t,i}]_{t\in \mathcal{F}^{N},i\in N}$ with the fuzzy Shapley value of the restricted game $v_{t}$ in each
row $t$ , is apamas.
In the following we introduce the egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy
games by adjusting the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the con-
strained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games. For each $s\in \mathcal{F}^{N}$ , let
$\lceil s\rfloor:=\sum_{i=1}^{n}s_{i}$ . Given $v\in CFG^{N}$ and $s\in \mathcal{F}_{0}^{N}$ we denote by $\alpha(s, v)$ the ave-
rage worth of $s$ with respect to the aggregated participation level of players
in $N$ , that is
$\alpha(s, v):=\frac{v(s)}{\lceil s\rfloor}$ .
Note that $\alpha(s, v)$ can be viewed as aper participation-level-unit value of
coalition $s$ .
The next theorem (Theorem 6in Branzei et al. (2002c)) guarantees that
in each step $k$ of the adjusted Dutta-Ray algorithm there is aunique maximal
element in $\arg\sup_{s\in \mathcal{F}_{0}^{N}}\alpha(s, v_{k})$ which corresponds to acrisp coalition, say
$S_{k}$ , implying that the adjusted Dutta-Ray algorithm is afinite algorithm.
Theorem 15 Let $v\in CFG^{N}$ . Then




(eT, $v$ ) $)$ generates the largest element in
The egalitarian solution $E(v)$ of aconvex fuzzy game $v$ is obtained by
the adjusted Dutta-Ray algorithm as follows:
Step. 1. Let $N_{1}:=N$ , $v_{1}:=v$ . Let $S_{1}$ be the crisp coalition generating the
largest element in $\arg\sup_{s\in \mathcal{F}_{0}^{N}}\alpha(s, v_{1})$ . Define $E_{i}(v)=\alpha(e^{S_{1}}, v_{1})$ for each
$i\in S_{1}$ . If $S_{1}=N$ , then we stop else go to Step 2.
Step 2. Let $N_{2}:=N_{1}\backslash S_{1}$ and $v_{2}$ defined for each $s\in[0,1]^{N\backslash S_{1}}$ by
$v_{2}(s)=v_{1}(e^{S_{1}}\cap s)-v_{1}(e^{S_{1}})$ ,
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where $(e^{S_{1}}\cap$s) is the element in [0,$1]^{N}$ with
$(e^{S_{1}}\cap s)_{i}=\{$
1if $i\in S_{1}$
$s_{i}$ if $i\in N\backslash S_{1}$
One can take the largest element $e^{S_{2}}$ in $\arg\max_{S\in 2^{N_{2\backslash \{\emptyset\}}}}\alpha$ $(e^{S}, v_{2})$ and
define $E_{i}(v)=\alpha(e^{S_{2}}, v_{2})$ for all $i\in S_{2}$ . If $S_{1}\cup S_{2}=N$ we stop; otherwise
we continue by considering the convex fuzzy game $v_{3}$ , etc.
After afinite number of steps the algorithm stops, and the obtained allocation
$E(v)$ is called the egalitarian solution of the convex fuzzy game $v$ .
Theorem 16 Let v $\in CFG^{N}$ . Then
(i) $E(v)=E(cr(v))i$
(ii) $E(v)\in C(v)$ ;
(ii) $E(v)$ Lorenz dominates every other allocation $x\in C(v)$ .
Proof. See Theorem 7in Branzei et al. (2002c). va
Remark 17 Theorem 16 implies that we can calculate the egalitarian solu-
tion of a convex fuzzy game by considering the corresponding crisp game and
applying on it the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm.
Definition 18 Given a cooperative fuzzy game $v$ , we define the equal division
core $EDC(v)$ as the set
$\{x\in\Re^{N}|\sum_{i\in N}x_{i}=v(e^{N})$ , $\# s$ $\in F_{0}^{N}s.t$. $\alpha(s, v)>x_{i}$ for all $i\in car(s)\}$ .
Each $x\in EDC(v)$ can be seen as adistribution of the value of the grand
coalition $e^{N}$ , where for each fuzzy coalition $s$ , there is aplayer $i$ with a
positive participation level for which the pay-0ff $x_{i}$ is at least as good as the
equal division share $\alpha(s, v)$ of $v(s)$ in $s$ .
Some interesting facts concerning the equal division core for convex fuzzy
games are collected in





Proof. See Theorem 8in Branzei et al. (2002c). ss
Based on Theorems 18 and 19 and using Klijn et al. (2000) we have
obtained in Branzei et al. (2002c) an axiomatic characterization of the egali-
tarian solution on the class of convex fuzzy games.
Theorem 20 There is a unique solution on CFG satisfying the properties
efficiency, equal division stability and $\max$-consistency, and it is the egalita-
rian solution.
Here equal division stability of asolution means that the solution assigns
to any convex fuzzy game an element of the equal division core.
4Final comments
First, note that for aconvex fuzzy game all the presented solution con-
cepts coincide with the corresponding solution concepts of the associated
crisp game which is also convex. Therefore one can take the advantage of
the available efficient algorithms for convex crisp games to compute solution
concepts for convex fuzzy games. Note also the parallelism between the prop-
erties of the presented solutions for convex fuzzy games and those of convex
crisp games. For other characterizing properties of convex fuzzy games we
refer to Tijs and Branzei (2003).
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